Abstract. We consider an infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum game with incomplete information on one side, in which the maximizer is the (more) informed player. Such games have value v y ð pÞ for all 0 a p a 1. The informed player can guarantee that all along the game the average payo¤ per stage will be greater than or equal to v y ðpÞ (and will converge from above to v y ðpÞ if the minimizer plays optimally). Thus there is a conflict of interest between the two players as to the speed of convergence of the average payo¤s-to the value v y ð pÞ. In the context of such repeated games, we define a game for the speed of convergence, denoted SG y ðpÞ, and a value for this game. We prove that the value exists for games with the highest error term, i.e., games in which v n ðpÞ À v y ðpÞ is of the order of magnitude of 1 ffiffi n p . In that case the value of SG y ðpÞ is of the order of magnitude of 1 ffiffi n p . We then show a class of games for which the value does not exist. Given any infinite martingale X y ¼ fX k g y k¼1 , one defines for each n : V n ðX y Þ :¼ E P n k¼1 jX kþ1 À X k j. For our first result we prove that for a uniformly bounded, infinite martingale X y , V n ðX y Þ can be of the order of magnitude of n 1=2Àe , for arbitrarily small e > 0.
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Introduction
In this paper we treat a two-person zero-sum infinitely repeated game with incomplete information on one side.1 Let A 1 ; A 2 be 2 Â 2 matrices, each corresponding to the payo¤ of a two-person zero-sum game, with elements a k ij , where k A f1; 2g represents the number of the matrix and i A I ¼ fT; Bg and j A J ¼ fL; Rg are the pure strategies of PI (the maximizer) and PII (the minimizer), respectively. For each p, 0 a p a 1, we consider the nstage repeated game G n ð pÞ, defined as follows:
. At stage 0, chance chooses k ¼ 1 with probability p, and k ¼ 2 with probability p 0 ¼ 1 À p. Both players know p, but (only) PI is informed about the chosen value of k.
. At stage 1, PI, knowing k, chooses i 1 A I , PII chooses j 1 A J, and ði 1 ; j 1 Þ is publicly announced.
. At stage m, m ¼ 2; 3. . PI, knowing k and ði 1 ; j 1 Þ Á Á Á ði mÀ1 ; j mÀ1 Þ, chooses i m A I . PII, knowing ði 1 ; j 1 Þ Á Á Á ði mÀ1 ; j mÀ1 Þ, chooses j m A J and ði m ; j m Þ is announced.
. After stage n, PI receives from PII the amount: , and for all m, 1 a m a n, s k m is a function from H m into the set of probability distributions on I. A (behavioral) strategy for PII is t n ¼ ðt 1 Á Á Á t n Þ, where for all m, 1 a m a n, t m is a function from H m into the set of probability distributions on J.
Remark 1.1. The di¤erence in the structure of the strategies of the two players is due to the fact that only PI knows the chosen value of k, and therefore can play di¤erently in each of the two matrices.
We now define the infinitely repeated game G y ðpÞ, as follows: A strategy for PI in G y ð pÞ is s ¼ ðs 1 ; s 2 Þ, where for all k A f1; 2g, s k is an infinite sequence fs k n : n b 1g, and each s k n is a function from H n into the set of probability distributions on I. A strategy for PII in G y ðpÞ is t, where t ¼ ft n : n b 1g, and t n is a function from H n into the set of probability distributions on J.
For any pair of strategies, s; t, let g n ðs; tÞ be the average expected payo¤ for the n first stages in G y ðpÞ (or in any G l ð pÞ l b n), when s and t are played. That is:
(E p; s; t is the expectation with respect to the probability measure on H nþ1 induced by p; s; t.) From now on, we use s and t to denote strategies of PI and PII, respectively, in the game G y ðpÞ. . We say that PII can guarantee gðpÞ in G y ð pÞ if for any e > 0 there is t e and N e , such that:
g n ðs; t e Þ À gðpÞ a e En > N e ; Es:
. We say that G y ðpÞ has a value v y ð pÞ if both players can guarantee v y ðpÞ.
An alternative definition for the value of an infinitely repeated game would be the limit of the values of the n-stage games G n ðpÞ, namely: lim n!y v n ðpÞ, if this limit exists. (For more details see Zamir [10] ).
Denote by DðpÞ the one-stage zero-sum game with payo¤ matrix of
2 Dð pÞ can be interpreted as the one-stage game in which both players are not informed of the matrix chosen. Let uð pÞ ¼ val DðpÞ, and Cav uð pÞ be the smallest concave function that is greater than or equal to uð pÞ on ½0; 1.
Theorem (Aumann and Maschler [1] ):3 v y ð pÞ and lim n!y v n ð pÞ both exist, and:
In other words, in this model as long as we are only interested in the asymptotic properties of G n ðpÞ, both concepts -'the value of the limit-game', and the 'limit of the values' (of the finite games) -lead to the same result.
Motivation
We interpret G y ðpÞ as a model for finite long games in which the number of stages n is not known in advance. In such situations, the players have to play ''uniformly well'' in n, since any stage n can turn out to be the end of the game after which the payment procedure takes place. Aumann and Maschler constructed a strategy s Ã in G y ð pÞ (the splitting strategy, see e.g. p. 126 of [8] ,) such that g n ðs Ã ; tÞ b Cav uð pÞ; En; Et:
Similarly, they constructed an optimal strategy t Ã for PII (the Blackwell approachability strategy), such that there is a c > 0 satisfying that:
Property (1) is the key property of our model, on the basis of which we construct the game for the speed of convergence. By this result of Aumann and Maschler, PI can guarantee at least Cav uð pÞ for all n. Thus playing optimally for him means guaranteeing the slowest possible speed of convergence from above to Cav uðpÞ. Note that monotonicity of the sequence of payo¤s is not a requirement (nor can it be guaranteed by PI, since it depends also on PII's actions). The fact that PI should be interested in a slow speed of convergence follows from Property (1) which states that PI can guarantee that the payo¤s will converge to v y ð pÞ from above. Similarly, for PII playing optimally means guaranteeing the fastest speed possible. This leads naturally to the definition of the game for the speed of convergence, which we will denote SG y ð pÞ. The two main applications of SG y ðpÞ are:
. To define formally the level at which PI plays uniformly well in all finite games. The fact that PI does not know n and therefore cannot in general achieve v n ð pÞ, causes him a loss. A strategy which guarantees just Cav uð pÞ yields a loss of ðv n ðpÞ À Cav uðpÞÞ (compared to the situation in which PI knows n). This di¤erence can be of the order of magnitude of 1 ffiffi n p (Section 3). We will show that PI can reduce his loss to the order of 1 ffiffi
. Our game refines the notion of optimality (for PI) for the strategies in G y ðpÞ:
Any strategy s satisfying (1) is optimal in G y ðpÞ. We shall parameterize this set of optimal strategies by the speed of convergence of inf t g n ðs; tÞ to Cav uð pÞ. An optimal strategy for which ðinf t g n ðs; tÞ À Cav uðpÞÞ is of the same order of magnitude as f ðnÞ will be denoted by s f . This defines a natural ''preference'' of PI: If f is of a greater order of magnitude than g (i.e., Although this paper deals mostly with repeated games of incomplete information on one side, it is clear from this discussion that SG y ðpÞ is of interest in any infinite zero-sum game with the following properties: The infinite game has a value v y ð pÞ, and one of the players has the advantage of being able to guarantee v y ðpÞ uniformly in n. (e.g., PII has a strategy t, satisfying that: g n ðs; tÞ a v y ðpÞ En; Es).
Definitions and preliminary results
For all x denote: This is the extra gain that PI can guarantee by using s if the game ends after n stages (and similarly for PII: sup s g n ðs; tÞ À Cav uðpÞ).
The following proposition states the relationship between v n ð pÞ and its analogs in G y ðpÞ. This proposition expresses the intuition that both PI and PII have more freedom in their choices of strategies in G n ð pÞ than in G y ð pÞ, since a strategy in G n ðpÞ can depend on n, and a strategy in G y ðpÞ (where the end of the game is not known to the players) cannot depend on n. In other words, any strategy available to any of the players in G y ðpÞ is available to them also in G n ðpÞ (as its n-truncation); hence they can not ''do better'' in G y ð pÞ than in G n ð pÞ.
Proof: For any pair of strategies s and t of PI and PII in G y ð pÞ, we denote by s n , t n the n-truncation of s, t, respectively. Then for all s 0 , t 0 and for all n:
. inf t g n ðs 0 ; tÞ ¼ inf t n g n ðs 0 ; t n Þ a v n ðpÞ.
. sup s g n ðs; t 0 Þ ¼ sup s n g n ðs n ; t 0 Þ b v n ðpÞ. r
We are now in a position to define the game SG y ðpÞ and its value:
. The payo¤ matrices and the strategy spaces for each player are the same as in G y ðpÞ.
. The payo¤ function in this game is not a real number but rather the infinite sequence of expected payo¤s in the nth stage game generated by s and t, namely: fg n ðs; tÞg y n¼1 . Since the value of SG y ðpÞ that we will define next involves only the order of magnitude of sequences, comparing di¤erent strategies will be done only by comparing the order of magnitude of their respective payo¤ sequences. 
. If there is a c > 0, and N, such that cgðnÞ a f ðnÞ, En b N, we write that
. We say that PI can guarantee a rate of convergence of f b 0 in SG y ð pÞ if bc > 0 such that for all e > 0 bs e ð f Þ:
g n ðs e ð f Þ; tÞ À v y ð pÞ b cf ðnÞn Àe ; Et; n:
. We say that PII can guarantee a rate of convergence of g b 0 in SG y ðpÞ if bb > 0 such that for all e > 0 bt e ðgÞ:
g n ðs; t e ðgÞÞ À v y ð pÞ a bgðnÞn e ; Es; n:
. We say that SG y ðpÞ has a value v s ðpÞ if both PI and PII can guarantee v s ð pÞ in SG y ðpÞ. . The choice of n e for the definition of the asymptotic convergence is somewhat arbitrary and one could think of other, more general definitions. However, this is rather natural in the context of repeated games of incomplete information, where the upper bounds of the speed of convergence are known to be 1 ffiffi n p (see Section 3) and 1 n 2=3 (see [6] ).
Note that for SG y ð0Þ and SG y ð1Þ, there is always a value, and this value is 0 (where 0 is the constant zero sequence), since this is a game with complete information. [6] ).
We shall refer to this class of games as ''normal games''. For any strategy s of PI in G y ð pÞ (or in G n ðpÞ), define a sequence of random variables:4 P 1 1 p and for each n > 1,
That is, given h n , s and t, P n is the conditional probability that at stage 0 chance chose k ¼ 1. It can be shown that the distribution P n is independent of t since t is independent of k. The reason for this is that PI's belief as to the matrix that was chosen is dependent on PII's strategy only through PII's actions. Therefore, given the history, PI's belief is no longer dependent on PII's strategy. It can also be shown that P y ¼ fP n g y n¼1 is a martingale. Hence, any strategy of PI in G y ð pÞ, yields an infinite martingale P y ¼ fP n g y n¼1 satisfying 0 a P n a 1, En.
For all n and all m b n let:
The nth variation is a measure for the expected amount of information revealed by PI up to (and including) stage n, when he uses the strategy s. Note that the definition for V n ðP m Þ holds also for m ¼ y.
The variation V n ðP m Þ plays a key role in the analysis, since the extra gain of PI (beyond Cav uðpÞ) is constrained by the amount of information he reveals. More precisely: it is proved (see p. 224 of [3] ) that there is c > 0, such that inf t g n ðs; tÞ a 1 n
for all n a m and all s (a strategy in G m ðpÞ, m b n). By the Cauchy-Schwarts inequality and the fact that P y is a uniformly bounded martingale, one can prove that5
; for all n; ðm b nÞ:
Remark 3.8. It follows from (3) and (4) that eð pÞ a O Ã 1 ffiffi n p .
4 For background see e.g. p. 189 of [4] and p. 122 of [8] .
5 See e.g. proposition 3.8 p. 122 of [8] .
It was proved (see Mertens and Zamir [5] 
Hence from (3) it follows that there is a c > 0 such that for each n there is an n-length martingale of probabilities P n satisfying that
Mertens and Zamir also proved6 that for any infinite uniformly bounded martingale P y , lim n!y
Result 3.9. From the above we get that if v s ðpÞ exists, then it satisfies:
From this point we proceed as follows:
. Although there isn't any infinite uniformly bounded martingale X
. In Part 5 we construct for any e > 0, a strategy s e in G y ð pÞ, that yields an infinite martingale P y e that coincides with X y e in some interval ðl; uÞ in ½0; 1.
. In Part 6 we prove that by using the strategy constructed in part 5 in the normal games, PI guarantees a rate of convergence of O Ã 1 ffiffi n p . We prove that in these games there is a value v s ðpÞ for SG y ð pÞ Ep A ð0; 1Þ, and that
. We conclude by showing in Part 7 a class of games that for all 0 < p < 1, does not have a value for SG y ð pÞ.
On the variation of uniformly bounded infinite martingales
As mentioned earlier, Mertens and Zamir proved7 that for any infinite uniformly bounded martingale P y , lim n!y
Our first result states that although the n-stage variation of a uniformly bounded infinite martingale is strictly smaller than O Ã ð ffiffi ffi n p Þ, it can be of O Ã ðn 1=2Àe Þ for arbitrarily small e > 0. From the discussion above it is clear that the behavior of infinite bounded martingales plays a central role in our model; therefore, it is not surprising that our result will be based on the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.
For any e > 0, h > 0 and 0 a l < p < u a 1, there is c > 0 and a martingale X y e ¼ fX n g y n¼1 with EX 1 ¼ p that satisfies:
1=2Àe En.
Furthermore:
Proof: We construct a martingale that satisfies (a) and (b). For a given 0 < y < 1, let Y k , k ¼ 1; 2 . . . ; be i.i.d. random variables, defined by:
The required martingale X y e is now defined as follows: X 1 1 p, and for all n > 1:
where n 0 ¼ nðe; p; l; uÞ is a constant that we choose so that X y e satisfies (a) and (b). To prove that there is an n 0 such that X y e satisfies (a) and (b), we shall prove the following two lemmas. . X y is finite almost surely. . EX y ¼ p. . The convergence of X n to X y is almost uniform; that is, for all h; d > 0, there is an N such that
where M e ¼ P y
Since EjX n j a M e þ 1 En, we get that by the martingale Convergence Theorem,8 X y ¼ lim n!y X n exists and is finite, and EX y ¼ p.
Using Egoro¤ 's theorem9, we get that the convergence of X n to X y is almost uniform. r Lemma 4.4. For any d; h > 0, there is an N ¼ Nðd; hÞ, such that for any n 0 > N, the process X y e constructed using n 0 will satisfy PðjX n À X y j < d; EnÞ b 1 À h:
Proof: Consider the above-defined process with n 0 ¼ 0; that is, for each n > 1
By Lemma 4.3 we have that for any d > 0 and h > 0, there is an N ¼ Nðd; hÞ such that
Now for any n 0 : X y À X n 1X X y ÀX X nþn 0 , so we have
So for any such process defined with n 0 > N, where N satisfies (7), we get:
and with that we have proved lemma 4.4. r
To complete the definition of the martingale X y e , we now define n 0 as follows.
Given e; p; l and u, such that 0 a l < p < u a 1, define d Ã ¼ min . We now prove that the martingale X y e satisfies (a):
. To prove that X y e satisfies (b): Denote minðy; y 0 Þ by a.
for some c > 0; hence
In particular, V n ðX . As long as P nÀ1 A ðl; uÞ; then:
. If there is N such that P N B ðl; uÞ, then for all n b N : P n 1 P N ; in other words, P y e absorbs outside ðl; uÞ.
Since in ðl; uÞ P Pðl < P n < u; EnÞ ¼ Pðl < X n < u; EnÞ b 1 À h:
In particular, for all n: Pðl < P m < u; Em a nÞ b 1 À h.
The speed of convergence in repeated games
And so:
jP kþ1 À P k j j l < P m < u; Em a n ( ) for all e > 0.
Constructing a strategy for PI with maximal variation
As mentioned earlier: inf t g n ðs; tÞ a Cav uð pÞ þ c n V n ðP y e Þ; En:
Therefore, a strategy for PI that will give him the highest O Ã ðinf t g n ðs; tÞÞ must have maximal O Ã ðV n ðP y e ÞÞ, where P y e is the martingale of the conditional probabilities derived from s. Note that any 0 < y < 1 defines the following strategy for PI in Dð pÞ: For any p Play pðTÞ ¼ y and pðBÞ ¼ y 0 . We concentrate on the normal games. These games have the following characteristics:
. PI has a strategy y, which is optimal for all p in DðpÞ and in G y ðpÞ.
. Cav uð pÞ 1 uð pÞ 1 0, which implies that, from any stage n on, PI can guarantee Cav uðpÞ (since uðP n Þ 1 Cav uð pÞ 1 0.) Thus he can deviate from the non-revealing optimal strategy y while guaranteeing the asymptotic value Cav uð pÞ.
In order to use his extra information PI would like to deviate from y. He would like to do so in such a way that he would gain as close as possible to cn À1=2 . In particular, he has to make sure that with positive probability, P y e never absorbs to zero or one. The way to achieve that is to create a ''safe zone'' ðl; uÞ inside ð0; 1Þ and to construct a strategy that yields a martingale P y e which, as long as P y e is inside this zone, satisfies:
for some c > 0, (by exploiting our construction in the proof of Theorem 4.1.) Outside that zone, P y e is absorbed as PI will play the non-revealing optimal strategy y, and guarantee Cav uðpÞ ¼ 0 from there on. Theorem 4.1 guarantees that with positive probability P y e will always stay in the safe zone and hence achieve the maximal variation.
In Part 4, we defined the abbreviation: n 0 ðl; uÞ, for fixed e and p. We now define the safe zone ðl; uÞ as follows:
. We also define the following sequence jðnÞ as follows.
. . Otherwise, jðnÞ ¼ ðn 0 ðl; uÞ þ n þ MÞ 1=2þe , where M is defined as above.
For any e > 0, we will construct a strategy s e for PI such that the sequence of conditional probabilities yielded by it will be the same as P y e for that e. The only information about the history that PI will use at stage n is the conditional probability P n , and so by abuse of notation we denote s k n ðP n Þ as the probability that PI will choose T at stage n, given K ¼ k and P n .
Definition of s e : Given 0 < y < 1, for any stage n ¼ 1; 2 . . . ;
. If l < P n < u, then:
. Otherwise, s k n ðP n Þ ¼ sðP n Þ for k ¼ 1; 2, where sðP n Þ is an optimal strategy of PI in DðP n Þ ¼ P n A 1 þ ð1 À P n ÞA 2 . . If P n B ðl; uÞ, then it is obvious since s k n ðP n Þ is an optimal strategy of PI in DðP n Þ.
. If P n A ðl; uÞ then:
We have to prove that y þ b 1, so we get:
In the same way we prove that 0 a s Proof: fP n g y n¼1 is a martingale that satisfies: . If P n A ðl; uÞ, then by definition:
And so by (8) , if P n A ðl; uÞ, then:
That is: P P nþ1 ¼ P n þ y 0 jðnÞ ¼ Pði n ¼ TÞ ¼ y and:
In other words, if P n A ðl; uÞ, then:
. If P n B ðl; uÞ, then s k n ðP n Þ ¼ sðP n Þ, k ¼ 1; 2. That is s e is then non revealing, and so: P m ¼ P n En; i.e., P n is absorbed outside ðl; uÞ, which concludes the proof of lemma 5.3. r
The speed of convergence in the normal games
We will now use s e which we constructed in Section 5 for the normal games. We will show that by using it, PI guarantees maximal speed of convergence. That is, there is a c > 0 such that for all t: g n ðs e ; tÞ À Cav uð pÞ b c n 1=2þe , En.
Theorem 6.1. In the normal games there is a value v s ðpÞ for SG y ðpÞ, for all 0 < p < 1, and v s ðpÞ ¼ O Ã 1 ffiffi n p .
The normal games were characterized by Mertens and Zamir,10 who showed that a normal game has a presentation of:
Àyb yb 0 0 < y; a; b < 1 and without loss of generality a > b.
We will prove the theorem by proving two lemmas:
Lemma 6.2. In the normal games: PI can guarantee O Ã 1 ffiffi n p in SG y ðpÞ for all 0 < p < 1.
Proof: For e > 0, use s e which was defined in Part 5.
At stage n:
. If P n A ðl; uÞ, and PII is using ðt; t 0 Þ, then the payo¤ for this stage is: Games with strictly concave uð pÞ represent cases in which PI prefers the situation that none of the players know which is the game played, rather than the situation that both of them do know. To see that, note that when none of the players know which game is being played then they play Dð pÞ and the value is uðpÞ. If both players know which game is being played, then both can play optimal in that game, so the value is:
where v 1 , v 2 are the values of A 1 , A 2 , respectively. (Note that uð1Þ ¼ v 1 and uð0Þ ¼ v 2 .) By the strict concavity of uðpÞ, we have:
uð pÞ > puð1Þ þ p 0 uð0Þ ¼ pv 1 þ p 0 v 2 ; for all 0 < p < 1:
So in such games we would expect PI to be conservative in his use of information, in order not to reveal it to PII. It turns out that in G y ð pÞ, PI should never use his information. Proof: Since uðpÞ is strictly concave, then for all p:
Cav uð pÞ ¼ uðpÞ:
(1) If s is a non-revealing (NR) strategy, that is for all n: s 1 n ðh n Þ 1 s 2 n ðh n Þ then for all n: inf t g n ðs; tÞ a uð pÞ ¼ Cav uðpÞ:
Thus the NR optimal strategy in G y ðpÞ, consisting of playing repeatedly an optimal strategy in Dð pÞ, guarantees 0 in SG y ðpÞ.
(2) We claim that any other strategy s is not (even) optimal in G y ð pÞ. We do that by proving that there is an N and d > 0 such that inf t g n ðs; tÞ < uð pÞ À d. En > N.
Letn n be the first stage such that s inf t g n ðs Ã n ; tÞ ¼ uðpÞ þ cðpÞ n :
So, for any strategy t n of PII in G n ð pÞ:
g n ðs Ã n ; t n Þ b uðpÞ þ cðpÞ n :
Since uðpÞ is concave, for all p: uðpÞ ¼ Cav uð pÞ, and so:
g n ðs Ã n ; t n Þ b Cav uð pÞ þ cðpÞ n :
Now PII cannot play better in G y ðpÞ than in any G n ðpÞ, (see Proposition 3.1 in part 3), which implies that if PII guarantees g in SG y ðpÞ, then: We conclude with an example of a game in which for all 0 < p < 1, v s ð pÞ does not exist and the gap between any f ; g that PI and PII can respectively guarantee in SG y ðpÞ is bounded away from zero by ln n n . Let: 
